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RULE 41 AMENDMENTS PROVIDE FOR A DRASTIC 
EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT 
COMPUTER SEARCHES AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT 
MARKUS RAUSCHECKER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Advances in technology have created gaps in the law that hinder the 
capabilities of law enforcement to conduct its investigations and prosecute 
criminals.  Prior to December 1, 2016, such a gap existed in Rule 41 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.1  As it was written, the Rule contained 
a territorial limitation on a magistrate judge’s ability to issue a search warrant 
and limited law enforcement’s ability to successfully apply for search war-
rants targeting internet-connected computers.2  With a few exceptions, mag-
istrate judges were authorized to issue warrants only when the warrant was 
to be executed within the judge’s district.3  This territorial limitation pre-
sented a problem for law enforcement as more and more online users began 
employing technological tools to hide their locations.4  When law enforce-
ment was unable to clearly identify the location of a computer it wanted to 
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 1.  Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b), 18 U.S.C. app. (2012) 
(amended 2016). 
 2.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b), H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 113TH CONG., FEDERAL RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 52–53 (Comm. Print 2014) (amended 2016). 
 3.  Id.  
 4.  Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks Highlighting 
Cybercrime Enforcement at Center for Strategic and International Studies (Dec. 7, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-delivers-remarks-
highlighting-cybercrime; see also Andy Greenberg, How to Anonymize Everything You Do Online, 
WIRED (June 17, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/06/be-anonymous-online/ (noting 
that “cryptography has shifted from an obscure branch of computer science to an almost mainstream 
notion,” which makes it possible to hide internet activity). 
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search, judges were hesitant to issue search warrants, because they were con-
cerned that the computer could be located outside of their district and the 
warrant would, therefore, run afoul of the territorial limitation of Rule 41.5 
On April 28, 2016, Chief Justice John Roberts submitted a letter to Con-
gress, giving notice of changes to Rule 41.6  The change to Rule 41 marked 
the end of a three-year rulemaking process that included a long period of 
public comment.7  Public hearings were held by the Advisory Committee on 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The Advisory Committee approved 
the rule change.  The amendments were then unanimously approved by the 
Standing Committee on Rules and the Judicial Conference, and adopted by 
the United States Supreme Court.8  The amendments went into effect on De-
cember 1, 2016.9  The December 1, 2016, amendments to Rule 41 read as 
follows: 
[A] magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities 
related to a crime may have occurred has authority to issue a war-
rant to use remote access to search electronic storage media and to 
seize or copy electronically stored information located within or 
outside that district if: (A) the district where the media or infor-
mation is located has been concealed through technological means; 
or (B) in an investigation of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5), 
the media are protected computers that have been damaged without 
authorization and are located in five or more districts.10 
Proponents of the Rule 41 amendments see the changes as critical to 
enabling law enforcement to effectively conduct investigations and prosecute 
criminals in light of new technologies used by these criminals.11  Presumably, 
everyone would agree that criminals should be identified and prosecuted, yet 
                                                          
 5.  See, e.g., In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 
2d 753, 757, 761 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (denying a search warrant application because territorial require-
ments were not met). 
 6.  Letter from John G. Roberts, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Paul D. Ryan, Speaker, 
U.S. House of Representatives, and Joseph R. Biden Jr., President, U.S. Senate (Apr. 28, 2016), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcr16_mj80.pdf.  The Supreme Court has au-
thority to write rules of procedure pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, which was enacted by Con-
gress in 1934.  Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2071–77 (2012)).   
 7.  Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Ron Wyden, 
Senator, U.S. Senate (Nov. 18, 2016), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3225184/DOJ-
Rule-41-Response.pdf. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Letter from John G. Roberts to Paul Ryan & Joseph Biden, supra note 6. 
 10.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(B)(6); see also Letter from John G. Roberts to Paul Ryan & Joseph 
Biden, supra note 6. 
 11.  See, e.g., Leslie R. Caldwell, Rule 41 Changes Ensure a Judge May Consider Warrants 
for Certain Remote Searches, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 20, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ar-
chives/opa/blog/rule-41-changes-ensure-judge-may-consider-warrants-certain-remote-searches. 
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the Rule 41 amendments are concerning in that they provide for a drastic 
expansion of government authority.  Given that the rule changes are not 
merely procedural, but provide a substantive expansion of government au-
thority to conduct searches, the Supreme Court acted beyond the rulemaking 
authority granted to it through the Rules Enabling Act.  Rather, Congress 
should have initiated, debated, and enacted these significant changes to Rule 
41. 
Part I of this Essay discusses the arguments in support of the Rule 41 
changes.  The changes provide law enforcement with a way to conduct com-
puter searches in light of new technologies used by criminals.  Part II dis-
cusses arguments against the Rule 41 changes.  Opposition to the changes 
existed in Congress, where Senator Wyden led an effort to prevent the 
changes from taking effect.  The Senator was joined by others arguing that 
these rule changes are a significant expansion of government authority to 
conduct searches and Congress should debate these changes.  Civil liberties 
groups also opposed the changes arguing that they provide for a drastic ex-
pansion of governmental surveillance powers and jeopardize privacy. 
Part III of the Essay provides a closer analysis of the Rule 41 changes.  
By examining the precise language of the amendments, it becomes evident 
that the rule changes are vague and do, in fact, substantively expand the gov-
ernment’s ability to conduct searches.  Furthermore, the rule changes violate 
the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  Part IV of the Essay 
discusses likely additional consequences of the rule changes, such as viola-
tions of warrant notice requirements, violations of international law, and fo-
rum shopping. 
I.  ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE RULE 41 AMENDMENTS 
The change to Rule 41 is intended to help law enforcement investigate 
and prosecute certain computer crimes.12  The advancement of technology 
has made it more difficult for law enforcement to conduct its investigations, 
because it is now difficult to locate search-targeted computers.  Calls for 
amending Rule 41 go back to April 2013, when a judge rejected a federal 
government remote electronic search warrant application.13  Prior to the rule 
change, courts would deny search warrants in cases where the location of the 
target computer was unknown (except in limited situations), as the target 
computer may have been located outside of the court’s district.14 
                                                          
 12.  Letter from Peter J. Kadzik to Ron Wyden, supra note 7. 
 13.  See In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 
761 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (denying a search warrant because of Rule 41 concerns and recognizing po-
tential rationale for updating the rule). 
 14.  See, e.g., id.  
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A.  In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown 
The case of In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises 
Unknown15 (“In re Warrant”) illustrates the reasoning for courts’ refusals to 
grant search warrants when the target computers’ locations are unknown.16  
In In re Warrant, the Government requested a search and seizure warrant 
pursuant to Rule 41 to target a computer that was allegedly used to violate 
federal bank fraud, identity theft, and computer security laws.17  Based on the 
warrant, the Government sought to install data extraction software on the tar-
get computer to collect both metadata and content stored on the computer, 
such as internet activity, emails, and photographs.18  The Government, how-
ever, did not know the precise location of the target computer, nor could it 
ensure that only the targeted computer would be affected by the search.  Ac-
cording to the court, the Government thereby failed to satisfy the territorial 
limits of Rule 41, as well as the particularity requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.19  Thus, the court denied the Government’s warrant applica-
tion.20 
The court’s reasoning began with the premise that Rule 41 allows a 
“magistrate judge with authority in the district . . . to issue a warrant to search 
for and seize a person or property located within the district.”21  At the time 
of the In re Warrant decision, Rule 41 authorized the issuance of a warrant 
if the target property was outside of the judge’s district in only a few limited 
circumstances: (1) when the target property “might . . . be moved outside the 
[court’s] district before the warrant [was] executed”; (2) when the target 
property was part of a terrorism investigation; (3) if the warrant pertained to 
a tracking device that was installed inside the judge’s district, but had been 
moved outside the judge’s district; (4) when “activities related to the 
crime . . . occurred” in the judge’s district, and the target property was located 
in a United States territory, or on “the premises—no matter who own[ed] 
them—of a United States diplomatic or consular mission in a foreign state.”22  
The In re Warrant court reviewed each of these exceptions to the territorial 
                                                          
 15.  958 F. Supp. 2d 753. 
 16.  Id. at 756–61.  
 17.  Id. at 755. 
 18.  Id. at 755–56. 
 19.  Id. at 757, 759; see infra text accompanying note 25 (explaining the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity requirement).  
 20.  In re Warrant, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 755. 
 21.  Id. at 757 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1)). 
 22.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(2)–(5).  The sections of Rule 41 that are cited here were not affected 
by the 2016 amendments.  Letter from John G. Roberts to Paul Ryan & Joseph Biden, supra note 
6.  
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limitation of Rule 41 and determined that none applied to the Government’s 
warrant application.23 
The court then turned to the Fourth Amendment’s particularity require-
ment.  The Fourth Amendment prescribes, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”24  In consid-
ering the particularity requirement, the court began by stating, “[t]he Gov-
ernment’s application contain[ed] little or no explanation of how the Target 
Computer w[ould] be found.”25  Furthermore, the court argued, “[t]he Gov-
ernment’s application offer[ed] nothing but indirect and conclusory assur-
ance that its search technique w[ould] avoid infecting innocent computers or 
devices . . . .”26  Because the Government neither showed how it would iden-
tify the target computer nor provided assurances that the search would not 
include other devices, the court rejected the Government’s warrant applica-
tion on the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, in addition to the 
Rule 41 territorial requirement.27  Interestingly, however, in the concluding 
paragraph of its opinion, the court acknowledged that “there may well be a 
good reason to update the territorial limits of that rule in light of advancing 
computer search technology.”28 
B.  The Department of Justice’s Arguments for Amending Rule 41 
After the ruling in In re Warrant, the Department of Justice sought to 
have Rule 41 amended.  In a letter submitted to the Advisory Committee on 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Department argued in favor of 
the Rule 41 amendments “to address two increasingly common situations.”29  
First, the Department of Justice often knew what computer it wanted to 
search, but did not know the district in which the computer was located.30  
Secondly, the Department increasingly found itself needing to “coordinate 
searches of multiple computers in multiple districts.”31  Both of these situa-
                                                          
 23.  In re Warrant, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 757–58. 
 24.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 25.  In re Warrant, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 758. 
 26.  Id. at 759. 
 27.  Id. at 758–59. 
 28.  Id. at 761. 
 29.  Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the 
Honorable Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Criminal Rules 1 (Sept. 18, 2013), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Raman-letter-to-committee-.pdf. 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id. at 1–2. 
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tions represent instances of when the Department’s investigative and enforce-
ment capabilities were limited due to advances in technology.32  Specific ex-
amples highlighted by the Department involved “a fraudster exchanging 
email with an intended victim or a child abuser sharing child pornography 
over the Internet [who] may use proxy services designed to hide his or her 
true IP address.”33  The Department concluded: “There is a substantial public 
interest in catching and prosecuting criminals [like these,] who use anony-
mizing technologies, but locating them can be impossible for law enforce-
ment absent the ability to conduct a remote search of the criminal’s com-
puter.”34 
Additionally, the increasing emergence of botnets presents unique chal-
lenges to law enforcement.35  The magnitude of a botnet investigation, which 
may involve thousands or even millions of computers located in virtually 
every federal judicial district, imposes practical burdens on investigators.  
The Department of Justice argued: 
[A] large botnet investigation is likely to require action in all 94 
districts, but coordinating 94 simultaneous warrants in the 94 dis-
tricts would be impossible as a practical matter.  At a minimum, 
requiring so many magistrate judges to review virtually identical 
probable cause affidavits wastes judicial and investigative re-
sources and creates delays that may have adverse consequences for 
the investigation.36 
Considering the challenges posed by new technologies, such as botnets, 
the Department of Justice argued that it needed new tools to maintain its in-
vestigative capabilities in the face of rapidly advancing technology.  In re-
sponse to prevailing critiques of the Rule 41 amendments, the Department 
posted a statement posted on its website, in which Assistant Attorney General 
Leslie R. Caldwell argued: 
 The amendments do not change any of the traditional protections 
and procedures under the Fourth Amendment, such as the require-
ment that the government establish probable cause.  Rather, the 
                                                          
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 2. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  A botnet refers to a group of computers that have been infiltrated by cybercriminals.  What 
Is a Botnet Attack?—Definition, KASPERSKY LAB, https://usa.kaspersky.com/internet-security-cen-
ter/threats/botnet-attacks#.WH00x7GZMUE (last visited May 17, 2017).  The cybercriminals in-
stall malware on the computers and create a network, which they then use to engage in cybercrime.  
Id.  
 36.  Letter from Mythili Raman to Reena Raggi, supra note 29. 
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amendments would merely ensure that at least one court is availa-
ble to consider whether a particular warrant application comports 
with the Fourth Amendment.37 
Caldwell emphasized that the amendments would not provide any new 
authority to law enforcement to conduct searches.38  Fundamentally, the De-
partment argued that the changes simply provide law enforcement with a 
framework within which to investigate and prosecute cybercrime in light of 
new technologies used by criminals.39 
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CHANGES TO RULE 41 
Opposition to the rule changes has been significant.  Not only have in-
terest groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Center for 
Democracy and Technology, criticized the changes, but also several mem-
bers of Congress have expressed their concerns and tried to block the amend-
ments from taking effect.  Opposition to the rule changes centered on the 
belief that the changes provided for a significant expansion of government 
authority to conduct computer searches.  Moreover, this increased govern-
mental authority would mean that individual privacy rights would be in-
fringed. 
A.  Congressional Opposition to the Rule 41 Amendments 
Congressional opposition against the Rule 41 amendments was led by 
Oregon Senator Ron Wyden.  Senator Wyden saw the amendments as a mas-
sive expansion of government authority to search computers.40  This search 
authority would not be limited to perpetrators of cybercrime, but include vic-
tims of crime as well.41  Due to these concerns, Senator Wyden called on 
Congress to reject the new rules through legislation. 
Senator Wyden was especially troubled by new government capabilities 
related to botnet investigations.  The Rule 41 changes would enable the gov-
ernment to obtain a single warrant that would permit it to access and search 
the thousands or millions of computers involved in a botnet.42  The majority 
of the searched computers would belong to victims of botnets, rather than the 
criminals behind the botnets.43  While the government may have a need to 
                                                          
 37.  Caldwell, supra note 11. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Press Release, Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden: Congress Must Reject Sprawling Expansion 
of Government Surveillance (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-re-
leases/wyden-congress-must-reject-sprawling-expansion-of-government-surveillance. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
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search affected botnet computers for evidence, such government authority 
nevertheless raises significant privacy concerns for computer owners whose 
computers may be searched. 
Finally, Senator Wyden was concerned about the way in which these 
rule changes were developed.  In his view, the rule changes implicate privacy 
rights, digital security and the Fourth Amendment.44  Therefore, the changes 
should not be left to the Supreme Court’s rulemaking process, but rather to 
Congress, the representative body of the American people, to decide: “Sub-
stantive policy changes like these are clearly a job for Congress, the Ameri-
can people and their elected representatives, not an obscure bureaucratic pro-
cess.”45 
Further evidence of congressional concern was presented on October 
27, 2016, when a group of over twenty concerned members of Congress sent 
a letter to then-U.S. Attorney General, Loretta Lynch, requesting responses 
to a series of significant questions about the rule change.46  In particular, the 
members asked Attorney General Lynch to specify how the department 
would notify users that their devices had been searched, the grounds on which 
probable cause authorizes “the remote search of tens of thousands of de-
vices,” and what procedures the department would put in place to protect 
users’ private information.47  These questions regarding the rule changes and 
the concerns about expanding government authority to search computers led 
Senator Wyden and others to introduce legislation to stop the rule changes.48  
Ultimately, however, the legislative efforts brought forth by Senator Wyden 
and others failed to prevent the rule changes from taking effect.49 
B.  Civil Liberties Groups’ Opposition to the Rule 41 Amendments 
Ever since the amendments to the rule were proposed, civil liberties 
groups argued that the changes provided for a dangerous expansion of gov-
ernment surveillance powers.  Indeed, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
which has been very vocal in its opposition to the rule changes, argued that 
the amendments are not “merely a procedural update.  [They] significantly 
expand[] the hacking capabilities of the United States government without 
                                                          
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Letter from Ron Wyden et al., Senator, U.S. Senate, to Loretta Lynch, Attorney Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=586322BE-A957-
4C97-94C3-23CD8219DE1F&download=1. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  S. 2952, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. 5321, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 49.  Joe Uchill, Last-Ditch Effort to Prevent Changes to Law Enforcement Hacking Rule Fails, 
THE HILL (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:13 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/308088-last-ditch-ef-
fort-to-prevent-change-to-rule-41-fails. 
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any discussion or public debate by elected officials.”50  If law enforcement is 
to be given a substantive expansion of its authority to conduct searches, then, 
according to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, that expansion should be 
provided by Congress as the representative body of the American people.51 
Similarly, the Center for Democracy and Technology called the Rule 41 
amendments “astoundingly dangerous” and posited that they could have 
“profound consequences for the privacy and security of computers world-
wide.”52 
While the Supreme Court has the authority to make changes to proce-
dural rules governing the federal courts, it may not make substantive changes 
to the law.53  Members of Congress as well as civil liberties groups saw the 
Rule 41 amendments as substantive changes to the law in that the amend-
ments expanded government’s ability to conduct computer searches and af-
fect computer users’ privacy.  From their perspective, Congress, as the legis-
lative branch, should have been the entity that passed the Rule 41 
amendments. 
III.  A CLOSER ANALYSIS OF THE RULE 41 AMENDMENTS 
The Rule 41 amendments provide a magistrate judge with the authority 
to issue a search warrant for a target computer outside of the judge’s district 
in two new circumstances: (1) when the location of the target “has been con-
cealed through technological means,” and (2) when, in a Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act investigation, the target computers “have been damaged without 
authorization and are located in five or more districts.”54  The implications of 
these amendments are concerning in that they drastically expand the scope of 
the government’s ability to conduct computer searches.  First, the amend-
ments allow government to search computers that are “concealed through 
technological means,” which is unduly vague language.  Second, the amend-
ments likely violate the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  
Third, the amendments will allow government to search not only the com-
puters of criminals, but the computers of the criminals’ victims as well.  
                                                          
 50.  Rainey Reitman, With Rule 41, Little-Known Committee Proposes to Grant New Hacking 
Powers to the Government, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 30, 2016), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/rule-41-little-known-committee-proposes-grant-new-hack-
ing-powers-government. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Jadzia Butler, U.S. Supreme Court Endorses Government Hacking, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY 
& TECH.: BLOG (May 6, 2016), https://cdt.org/blog/u-s-supreme-court-endorses-government-hack-
ing/. 
 53.  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substan-
tive right).  
 54.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6). 
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A.  Rule 41(b)(6)(A): “Concealed Through Technological Means” Is 
Vague and Drastically Expands the Scope of the Government’s 
Ability to Conduct Searches 
Law enforcement has been struggling with the increasingly common sit-
uation of needing to describe a computer to be searched, but not knowing its 
precise location.  Frequently, targets of law enforcement investigations are 
using technologies that hide their locations online.55  Undoubtedly, new 
anonymizing technologies provide challenges to law enforcement.  Yet, it has 
to be noted that such technologies are not just used by criminals.  Often, com-
puter users have very legitimate reasons for using technologies that hide their 
identities online. 
For example, as the Electronic Frontier Foundation points out, “people 
who use Tor, folks running a Tor node, or people using a VPN would cer-
tainly be implicated” by the Rule amendments.56  Furthermore, the new lan-
guage could extend to individuals who chose not to share their location with 
apps or ad networks, or people who change their country setting in order to 
gain access to services that they otherwise would not be able to.57  There are 
many additional reasons why someone may want to use anonymizing tech-
nologies: 
From journalists communicating with sources to victims of domes-
tic violence seeking information on legal services, people world-
wide depend on privacy tools for both safety and security.  Millions 
of people who have nothing in particular to hide may also choose 
to use privacy tools just because they’re concerned about govern-
ment surveillance of the Internet, or because they don’t like leaving 
a data trail around haphazardly.58 
These examples illustrate that, in many cases, individuals may hide their 
identities online for reasons that are not at all motivated by any criminal in-
tent.  The changes to Rule 41 could, however, subject these individuals to 
government searches. 
In response to these concerns, the Department of Justice argues that the 
use of anonymizing technology in and of itself does not provide grounds for 
a search warrant.  The government must still demonstrate probable cause that 
                                                          
 55.  ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, CRIMINAL RULES COMMITTEE MEETING 88 
(2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rules-
criminal-procedure-may-2015. 
 56.  Reitman, supra note 50; Ian Paul, How—and Why—You Should Use a VPN Any Time You 
Hop on the Internet, TECHHIVE (Jan. 18, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.techhive.com/arti-
cle/3158192/privacy/howand-whyyou-should-use-a-vpn-any-time-you-hop-on-the-internet.html; 
Tor: Overview, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited May 17, 
2017). 
 57.  Reitman, supra note 50. 
 58.  Id. 
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evidence of a crime will be discovered before a magistrate judge will issue a 
search warrant.  Assistant Attorney General Caldwell was blunt in her re-
marks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: 
[The update to the rule] doesn’t change the level of evidence and 
proof that we have to present to a judge in order to get the judge to 
agree that there’s probable cause to issue a warrant.  What [the rule] 
does change is, now, when criminals hide the location of their com-
puters through anonymizing technology, we don’t have to figure 
out which federal district the computers are physically located in 
before we can act to stop criminal activity.59 
Assistant Attorney General Caldwell’s comments imply that the use of 
anonymizing technology is not grounds for a search warrant.  Law enforce-
ment must still demonstrate probable cause that evidence of a crime will be 
found if a search warrant is to be issued.  Nevertheless, the amended Rule 
provides a new ability for government to conduct expansive searches of com-
puters.  Even if government is able to demonstrate probable cause, it must no 
longer clearly identify the location of a computer to be searched, and it may 
use a single warrant to search thousands or even millions of computers. 
B.  The Rule 41 Amendments Violate the Particularity Requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment 
The amendments to Rule 41 violate the Fourth Amendment’s particu-
larity requirement.  The Fourth Amendment requires that no warrants be is-
sued without “particularity describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.”60 
Without being able to describe the location of the target to be searched, 
it is difficult to see how law enforcement may satisfy the Fourth Amend-
ment’s particularity requirement.  Moreover, the methods that law enforce-
ment would presumably use to enable a search of a target computer could 
have the unintended consequence of accessing innocent computers.61  For 
example, the rule changes would allow a single warrant to be the basis for 
searching hundreds, thousands, or even millions, of computers if they are all 
part of a botnet.  It is doubtful that each of the many involved computers 
would be described with particularity. 
                                                          
 59.  The State of Cybercrime: A Look Back and a Look Forward, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L 
STUDIES 17:18 (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.csis.org/events/state-cybercrime-look-back-and-look-
forward.  
 60.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 61.  For example, law enforcement could access innocent computers through the use of water-
ing hole attacks or users forwarding a government phishing email.  See Memorandum from Amer-
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Unfortunately, these constitutional concerns were not explored by the 
Advisory Committee when it contemplated the rule changes.  Indeed, the 
Committee chose to pass questions of constitutionality on for the courts to 
decide: 
The amendment does not address constitutional questions, such as 
the specificity of description that the Fourth Amendment may re-
quire in a warrant for remotely searching electronic storage media 
or seizing or copying electronically stored information, leaving the 
application of this and other constitutional standards to ongoing 
case law development.62 
It is concerning that questions of constitutionality were not considered 
during the development of the rule amendments.  It is even more concerning 
that law enforcement would have new authorities that are potentially uncon-
stitutional until courts decide otherwise. 
C.  Rule 41(b)(6)(B): Allowing Government to Search Victim 
Computers That Are Part of a Botnet Is a Sweeping Expansion of 
Government Authority 
The amendments to Rule 41 will allow the government to search all 
computers that are part of a botnet.  This new authority is a sweeping expan-
sion of government authority.  In particular, Rule 41(b)(6)(B) allows a mag-
istrate judge of a district where activities related to a crime may have occurred 
to issue a warrant that permits law enforcement to use remote access to search 
electronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically stored infor-
mation.  A magistrate judge may exercise this authority if, “in an investiga-
tion of a violation of [the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act], the media are 
protected computers that have been damaged without authorization and are 
located in five or more districts.”63 
The effect of the rule changes, however, has worrisome implications for 
individual computer users, most of whom are not criminals.  The authority 
granted in this new section of Rule 41, 
means victims of malware could find themselves doubly infil-
trated: their computers infected with malware and used to contrib-
ute to a botnet, and then government agents given free rein to re-
motely access their computers as part of the investigation.  Even 
with the best of intentions, a government agent could well cause as 
much or even more harm to a computer through remote access than 
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the malware that originally infected the computer. . . .  Govern-
ment access to the computers of botnet victims also raises serious 
privacy concerns, as a wide range of sensitive, unrelated personal 
data could well be accessed during the investigation.64 
During a panel discussion presented by the Stanford Center for Internet 
and Society in October 2016, Allison Bragg, Assistant United States Attor-
ney, offered a justification for the government’s need to search computers 
that have been compromised as part of a botnet.65  She stated that data on 
computers that have been compromised as part of a botnet is evidence of a 
crime and the government must have access to that evidence.66  The govern-
ment’s need to obtain this evidence is the reason why the government should 
be able to search a “victim’s” computer.67  Bragg analogized this kind of 
search with the government executing a warrant to search the home of an 
innocent bystander to collect a gun that was used for a murder, unbeknownst 
to the gun-owner and owner of the home being searched.68  Since the govern-
ment’s search of the home is legal, Bragg argues, the government’s search of 
botnets is legal as well. 
The Department of Justice further responded to opponents of Rule 41 
amendments by stating: 
In general, we anticipate that the items to be searched or seized 
from victim computers pursuant to a botnet warrant will be quite 
limited.  For example, we believe that it may be reasonable in a 
botnet investigation to take steps to measure the size of the botnet 
by having each victim computer report a unique identifier; but it 
would not be lawful in such circumstances to search the victims’ 
unrelated private files.69 
In other words, law enforcement claims that it may not search the entire 
victim computer and that the particularity requirement limits the extent of 
what is to be searched and seized.  While the Department’s response may be 
commendable, it does not guarantee the scope of computer searches will not 
expand beyond the directly affected computer, or that private files truly re-
main private and protected.  Despite the Department’s assurances, countless 
computers may end up being searched pursuant to a single warrant issued on 
the basis of the new Rule 41 amendments.  The vast majority of the owners 
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 65.  Government Hacking: Rule 41, STANFORD LAW SCH. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y 
1:08:13–109:35 (Oct. 27, 2016), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/events/government-hacking-rule-41. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Letter from Peter J. Kadzik to Ron Wyden, supra note 8. 
 1098 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:1085 
 
of these computers will have no connection to the criminal activity being in-
vestigated other than being victims of the criminal botnet.  Moreover, the 
computer owners’ private information will be put at risk every time it is ac-
cessed remotely.  So, even if the Department intends to limit itself when con-
ducting computer searches under Rule 41, it is reasonable to expect that the 
number of computers and the information involved in a government search 
will be beyond the scope of the warrant. 
IV.  ADDITIONAL LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF THE RULE 41 AMENDMENTS 
In addition to specific concerns related to the venue amendments con-
tained in section (b)(6), there are other troubling consequences to the Rule 41 
amendments, including violations of warrant notice requirements, violations 
of international law, and forum shopping. 
A.  Rule 41 Amendments May Violate the Warrant Notice Requirement 
Rule 41(f)(1)(C) requires that an “officer executing [a] warrant must 
give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person 
from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken.”70  Recogniz-
ing the impracticality of notifying owners of computers of unknown location, 
or notifying every owner of the thousands or millions of computers involved 
in a botnet, Rule 41 establishes a different notice requirement for remote elec-
tronic searches.  In cases where government conducts remote electronic 
searches, government must only make “reasonable efforts” to notify the 
owner of the property that was searched: 
For a warrant to use remote access to search electronic storage me-
dia and seize or copy electronically stored information, the officer 
must make reasonable efforts to serve a copy of the warrant and 
receipt on the person whose property was searched or who pos-
sessed the information that was seized or copied.  Service may be 
accomplished by any means, including electronic means, reasona-
bly calculated to reach that person.71 
Providing notice to computer owners may be difficult and impractical.  
For its part, the Department of Justice says that in an investigation involving 
botnet victims, for example, the Department would make reasonable efforts 
to notify victims of searches: “if investigators obtained victims’ IP addresses 
at a particular date and time in order to measure the size of the botnet, inves-
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tigators could ask the victims’ Internet service providers to notify the indi-
viduals whose computers were identified as being under the control of crim-
inal bot herders.”72 
It is unrealistic, however, to expect every computer owner of an affected 
botnet to be notified of a government search.  Botnets may include hundreds, 
thousands, or millions of computers.  Due to this fact, there is a significant 
chance that owners of computers that have been searched will never receive 
notice that a search has occurred.  However, as long as government made a 
“reasonable effort” to notify owners of searched computers, government 
would be in compliance with Rule 41.  It is unclear, however, what notice 
attempts would constitute a reasonable effort.  Especially concerning is the 
fact that the owners of searched computers who do not get notice of a search 
may never find out that a search has occurred and will therefore never be able 
to contest the search warrant.  In this situation, a court will not review the 
search warrant’s legitimacy, thus failing to exercise a necessary check on law 
enforcement power. 
B.  Rule 41 Amendments May Lead to Violations of International Law 
If the location of a target computer is unknown, it may be the case that 
the computer is located outside of the United States.  If law enforcement con-
ducts an electronic remote search based on Rule 41, and the target computer 
is outside of the United States’ jurisdiction, such a search may be considered 
a violation of state sovereignty and international law. 
The Rule 41 amendments may run counter to United States treaty obli-
gations.  For example, the Convention on Cybercrime, also known as the Bu-
dapest Convention, is explicit about allowing trans-border access to stored 
computer data only if the data is publicly available or if “lawful and volun-
tary” consent is obtained from the country in which the search would take 
place.73 
Indeed, Department of Justice policies instruct law enforcement officers 
to: 
exercise their functions in the territory of another country only with 
the consent of that country . . . .  Moreover U.S. law enforcement 
should only make direct contact with an ISP located in [a foreign 
country] with (1) prior permission of the foreign government; (2) 
approval of [the Department of Justice’s] Office of International 
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Affairs . . . ; or (3) other clear indicia that such practice would not 
be objectionable in [the foreign country].74 
This Department policy aligns with the United States treaty obligation 
under the Convention on Cybercrime.  Furthermore, the Department of Jus-
tice assured the Advisory Committee: “[S]hould the media searched prove to 
be outside the United States, the warrant would have no extraterritorial effect, 
but the existence of the warrant would support the reasonableness of the 
search.”75  The Department thereby affirmed that it would not conduct 
searches outside of the United States pursuant to a warrant issued under the 
Rule 41 amendments. 
Nevertheless, if law enforcement does not actually know where a com-
puter is located, it may very well end up searching a computer that is located 
in another country.  If that happens, a violation of international law will have 
occurred and the legal, as well as the geo-political, fallout could be unsettling. 
C.  Rule 41 Amendments May Lead to Forum Shopping by Law 
Enforcement Officers Seeking a Search Warrant 
The Rule 41 amendments provide magistrate judges, in any district 
where activities related to a crime may have occurred, with the authority to 
issue warrants to conduct remote electronic searches.76  Given this Rule 
change, law enforcement officers who seek a remote electronic search war-
rant may be tempted to apply for the warrant in a district that is historically 
friendly to such government requests.  Such forum shopping is undesirable 
because it may further diminish protections against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  Different judges may have different opinions on the sufficiency 
of a warrant application, especially when complicated technological issues 
are involved.  Instead of having to seek a warrant in their own jurisdiction, 
where a judge may be less inclined to grant the warrant, law enforcement 
now has the ability to simply go to a different district where the magistrate 
judge has demonstrated a willingness to grant such warrants. 
According to the Department of Justice, the language of the amended 
rule actually limits the possibility of forum shopping.  The venue in which a 
magistrate judge may issue a warrant for a remote search is restricted to “any 
district where activities related to a crime may have occurred.”77  The De-
partment contends that this language will: 
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Often . . . leave only a single district in which investigators can 
seek a warrant.  For example, where a victim has received death 
threats, extortion demands, or ransomware demands from a crimi-
nal hiding behind Internet anonymizing technologies, the victim’s 
district would likely be the only district in which a warrant could 
be issued for a remote search to identify the perpetrator.78 
Despite the attempted assurances of the Department, however, it is not 
hard to imagine that law enforcement officers will tend to choose to apply for 
warrants in jurisdictions with sympathetic judges. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Proponents of the Rule 41 changes argue that the changes are procedural 
and not substantive.  They argue that the changes apply only to venue selec-
tion and will not negate fundamental legal requirements, such as demonstrat-
ing probable cause.  It is difficult, however, to deny the substantive effects of 
the rule change.  Given that the rule change, in its practical effect, provides 
for a significant expansion of the government’s ability to search computers, 
the amendments to Rule 41 should not have been adopted by the Supreme 
Court.  The Rules Enabling Act, which gives the Supreme Court the authority 
to prescribe rules of judicial procedure is explicit in that “such rules shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”79  Because the Rule 41 
amendments do provide new substantive authorities to law enforcement to 
conduct computer searches, the Supreme Court acted beyond its authority. 
Only Congress has the authority to allocate new legal authority to law en-
forcement through the legislative process.  With respect to Rule 41, elected 
officials should have debated these critical changes to the Rule publicly and 
considered the potential consequences carefully.  Even though the Rule 
changes went into effect on December 1, 2016, Congress could still choose 
to examine the amendments more closely and repeal or amend them in the 
future. For now, magistrate judges who are asked to issue a search warrant 
based on the new Rule 41 amendments should consider the application care-
fully to ensure Fourth Amendment protections are still protected. 
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